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 Strategic Effects of Electoral Rules 
Testing the Impact of the 2008  
Electoral Reform in Romania* 
 
FLORIN N. FEŞNIC, OANA I. ARMEANU 
 
 
 
Political institutions matter. Not only do they affect political outcomes 
(e.g., Duverger’s “mechanical effect”), but also they structure political behavior 
(Duverger’s “psychological effect”1). A change in the rules governing a 
political institution is quite often accompanied by a change in the incentives 
governing the behavior of political actors. Changes of the electoral systems are 
no exception to this rule; as a matter of fact, they are arguably the most 
prominent exemplification of it. 
In 2008, Romania changed the rules governing the election of the two 
Chambers of its Parliament (the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies), from 
closed party list proportional representation to a single-ballot mixed electoral 
system. One of the justifications offered for this change (in fact, the reason that 
was the most widely discussed), was to offer Romanian voters the chance to 
vote for a specific candidate. One of the implications is, then, that some voters 
may choose based on the qualities of candidates, rather than their ideological 
affiliation, and may in fact prefer to vote for a candidate who does not represent 
their preferred party. If that happens, the reform has “personalized” the vote 
and, by doing so, it achieved its purpose. If this does not happen, and voters 
continue to choose solely based on ideological preferences and party labels, 
then the electoral reform has failed. 
The purpose of this paper is precisely to test whether the reform did, in 
fact, have an effect. One way of testing this, with the benefit of hindsight, is to 
use aggregate returns from Romania’s first parliamentary elections held under 
the new electoral rules (November 2008), and compare those with the results of 
previous parliamentary elections (2000 and 2004), held under the old rules, and 
see whether the patterns of regional support for various political parties do 
change as a result of the aforementioned institutional reform. We develop a 
model of electoral behavior at the individual level which has observable 
                                                 
*  This research was supported by a CNCS-UEFISCDI grant, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-
2011-3-0669 (“Change and Stability in Romanian Electoral Behaviour, 2009-2014”). 
1
 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1966, pp. 224-226. 
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implications at the aggregate level2. We formalize these implications into 
hypotheses that we test with empirical data, the results of which indicate 
whether the electoral reform was successful or not. 
 
 
Types of Electoral Systems and “Personal” Vote: 
Previous Research 
 
There have been a number of studies on the effects of electoral systems 
on personalizing the vote. Carey and Shugart develop a ranking of electoral 
systems according to the degree to which they increase the incentives to 
cultivate a personal vote3. According to them, the likelihood of a personal vote 
increases with the increase in the freedom of choice for voters and with a 
decrease in party leaders’ control over candidate nomination. For instance, they 
rank the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) without party leadership control 
over nomination as the “zenith in the value of personal reputation relative to 
party reputation”4. Other systems that rank high are plurality systems that use 
primaries, because they create intraparty competition and party leaders cannot 
decide who will use the party label. The new Romanian electoral system used 
for the 2008 parliamentary elections falls, according to this ranking, somewhere 
in the middle. While it is more conducive to a personal vote compared to the 
previous system of party list PR, the party still controls the nomination and the 
party reputation still matters because the votes of a party’s candidates are 
pooled, determining the party’s share of the seats in the legislature5. 
Other authors using alternative classifications of electoral systems arrive 
at similar conclusions. Grofman, for instance, divide the Carey and Shugart 
                                                 
2
 This kind of approach (making inferences from the aggregate level to the individual level) 
is prone to the so-called “ecological fallacy”. For instance, if we observe that the French 
National Front receives a higher share of the vote in regions with a higher percentage of 
immigrants, it would be wrong to infer that it is the immigrants who constitute the core 
electorate of the National Front. Nonetheless, we believe this potential problem is 
mitigated (largely, even if not fully), in the present research: we are mostly interested 
inchange at the individual level (i.e., how and why the voters of party X change their 
vote, rather than describing the profile of these voters). However, it wouldbe clearly better 
to confirm our preliminary findings with individual-level data. 
3
 John M. Carey, Matthew Sobert Shugart, “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank 
Ordering of Electoral Formulas”, Electoral Studies, vol. 14, no. 4, 1995, pp. 417-439. 
4
  Ibidem, p. 429. 
5
 It is interesting to note what Carey and Shugart discuss as the downside of the personal 
vote, although it is not the subject of our study: “More attention by legislators to personal 
reputation would generally lead to more ‘pork’ in a country’s budgets […] Where, on the 
other hand, party reputation matters more, policymaking should be more ‘efficient’” 
(Ibidem, pp. 433-434). 
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index of “incentives to cultivate a personal vote” into two components: the 
degree of party-centeredness of the electoral system and the size of a legislator’s 
electoral constituency, i.e., the number of voters who voted for a candidate6. 
While their classification of electoral systems using their own criteria provides 
different results than those of Carey and Shugart for a number of electoral 
systems, such as the single transferable vote (STV) and the single non-
transferable vote (SNTV), it gives similar results for the mixed electoral 
systems, located in an intermediate position. Comparable results, but more 
difficult to interpret, are those of Pereira and e Silva, because they do not 
consider the very peculiar type of electoral system used in Romania in 2008. 
Pereira and e Silva develop an index of citizens’ freedom to choose the 
members of parliament as a function of ballot structure, district magnitude, and 
electoral formulas7. They find that STV, open ballot and open party list offer 
maximum freedom of choice to voters, while ranking mixed systems at an 
intermediate level of freedom. 
Other works focused on different aspects of mixed electoral systems. In a 
study of New Zealand elections, Karp8 is concerned with a possible 
contamination effect from candidates to parties in mixed systems. In those 
systems, where voters have the option of choosing the candidates, their strong 
preference for a candidate may influence their vote for the party, though it is the 
latter that will ultimately determine the partisan composition of the legislature. 
This applies mainly to two-ballot mixed systems, but it could also be 
extrapolated to the concomitant election of the two chambers of the Romanian 
Parliament in 2008, when a voter’s support for a candidate for one of the 
Chambers could have driven his/her party vote for the other chamber. Karp’s 
findings suggest a limited “coattail effect”. 
An important question for the new democracies, where party systems are 
weak and poorly institutionalized, is to what extent voters react to the incentives 
created by electoral rules. Moser and Scheiner address this question looking 
specifically at ticket-splitting in mixed electoral systems in post-communist 
countries9. Their results show a much higher prevalence of ticket-splitting and 
strategic voting in established democracies, where sophisticated voters make 
                                                 
6
 Bernard Grofman, “Comparisons among Electoral Systems: Distinguishing between 
Localism and Candidate-Centered Politics”, Electoral Studies, vol. 24, no.4, pp. 735-740. 
7
 Paulo Trigo Pereira, João Andrade e Silva, “Citizens’ Freedom to Choose 
Representatives: Ballot Structure, Proportionality and ‘Fragmented’ Parliaments”, 
Electoral Studies, vol. 28, no. 1, 2009, pp. 101-110. 
8
 Jeffrey A. Karp, “Candidate Effects and Spill-Over in Mixed Systems: Evidence from 
New Zealand”, Electoral Studies, vol. 28, no. 1, 2009, pp. 41-50. 
9
 Robert G. Moser, Ethan Schneier, “Strategic Voting in Established and New 
Democracies: Ticket Splitting in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems”, Electoral Studies, 
vol. 28, no. 1, 2009, pp. 51-61. 
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strategic calculations in order to improve the outcome. In contrast to this, ticket-
splitting and strategic voting in new democracies occur to a lesser extent, due to 
the difficulty for the voters to gain sufficient information in order to 
differentiate the strengths of the candidates. 
The literature discussed above leaves us with unclear expectations about 
the potential effects of the Romanian electoral reform. First, mixed electoral 
systems tend to fall into a grey middle area where no outcome appears as a 
surprise. Second, in new democracies, institutions are not expected to generate 
similar effects as in established democracies, at least in the short run. The 
expectation that emerges, however, based on previous research, is that the 
impact of the recent electoral reform is likely to be limited by two factors: the 
persistence of party control over the nomination process and the difficulties 
voters face in trying to make informed decisions. 
 
 
The Politics of Electoral Reform in Romania 
 
Discussions about reforming the Romanian electoral law began as early 
as 1995, but electoral reform has never been able to achieve strong support 
among the main political parties. This has remained largely true even when 
reform was eventually adopted in 2008, which explains the long delays during 
the adoption process and, most of all, the minimalist character of the reform. 
The outcome seemed more of an effort in damage control by parliamentary 
parties, rather than a well-designed plan intended to achieve a genuine reform. 
The idea originated with a civil society organization, Asociaţia Pro Democraţia 
(APD), which in 1995 initiated a bill aimed at reforming the existing electoral 
system, a party-list proportional representation, with a mixed system for the 
election of the lower house and a single-member district system for the election 
of the Senate10. The aim of this reform was to increase the responsibility of 
members of Parliament (MPs) and their ties with their constituents11. 
From 1998 to 2008, APD organized four campaigns with the goals to 
make its initiative known to the general public and gather the 250,000 required 
signatures to introduce the bill as a citizens’ initiative. Failing to collect the 
necessary number of signatures, APD attempted to rally the support of one of 
the major political parties. Even in 2003, after several APD campaigns and the 
collection of over 161,000 signatures on its legislative proposal, many MPs 
were unaware of the differences between various electoral systems and their 
                                                 
10
 Laura Munteanu (Bretea), La Réforme Electorale Roumaine, Master’s thesis, Université 
Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2008. 
11
 ASOCIAŢIA PRO DEMOCRAŢIA, Votul uninominal: întrebări frecvente, 
http://www.apd.ro/votuluninominal/intrebari_frecvente.php (accessed August 12, 2014). 
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consequences, while the parliamentary parties lacked a clear position regarding 
electoral reform12. The APD campaigns, however, succeeded in attracting 
public support for the bill. Their catchphrase was “uninominal vote”, reflecting 
the proposal to elect representatives in single member districts (SMDs). Opinion 
polls conducted after 2000 showed that over 60% of Romanians favored 
electoral reform, despite the fact that a majority of them (76%) knew little or 
nothing at all about the new proposal and only 17% were well informed, 
according to the same polls13. 
In subsequent years, APD exercised systematic pressure over the five 
parliamentary parties through a variety of campaigns, workshops, and street 
events about electoral reforms. Three of these parties, which declared their 
support for reform (the National Liberal Party-PNL, the Democratic-Liberal 
Party-PD-L, and the Party of Social Democracy-PSD), began working together 
in a parliamentary commission established in 2006 to amend the APD bill, but 
there was little progress. PRM (the Greater Romania Party) rejected the reform, 
while the ethnic UDMR (Democratic Union of Hungarians) demanded 
guarantees that the Hungarian minority will maintain the same representation 
under the new system14. In November 2007, Romanian President Traian 
Băsescu called a referendum on electoral reform, but the reform was not the one 
debated in the parliamentary commission, but an old alternative proposed by 
PSD, the majoritarian system with two rounds similar to the French system. The 
referendum failed due to the low turnout. 
The Parliament eventually concluded negotiations and adopted the bill in 
March 2008. The new electoral law reflected the compromises among the major 
parties: it included the “uninominal” concept, with voters casting a single ballot 
in SMDs, but due to a corrective mechanism the final outcome is very 
proportional. All the seats are initially filled by majority in SMDs. The 
remaining seats are then redistributed at the district level to the parties passing 
the threshold in proportion to the overall number of votes obtained nationally. A 
second redistribution takes then place at the national level. According to the 
classification of mixed electoral systems by Massicotte and Blais, this system 
falls in the category of correction systems15. This particular variant, in which the 
proportion of PR seats that provide the correction is left unspecified, is 
                                                 
12
 ASOCIAŢIA PRO DEMOCRAŢIA, Ştiri, Nr. 11 (20), noiembrie 2003, 
http://www.apd.ro/stiri_editie.php?id=19 (accessed March 1, 2009). 
13
 The Gallup Organization Romania, Gallup Polls 2002, http://www.gallup.ro/romana 
/poll_ro/releases_ro/pr020318_ro/pr020318_ro.htm (accessed March 27, 2009). 
14
  “Uninominalul: Sistem de vot disputat din faşă”, Jurnalul Naţional, http://www.jurn 
alul.ro/stire-politic/uninominalul-sistem-de-vot-disputat-din-fasa-140313.html (accessed 
March 27, 2009). 
15
 Louis Massicotte, André Blais, “Mixed Electoral Systems: A Conceptual and Empirical 
Survey”, Electoral Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, 1999, pp. 341-366. 
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extremely rare and, to our knowledge, is not currently used for general elections 
anywhere else in the world. The existence of three main parties competing16 
(PSD, PD-L, and PNL), in addition to the ethnic UDMR makes it very difficult 
to fill in the seat through majority. The allocation of seats through redistribution 
takes place through a complicated process, whose outcome is difficult to 
predict. It was expected and, indeed, election results confirmed it, that in a few 
dozens electoral districts candidates gaining only the third or fourth-best result 
won the seat nonetheless17. The question, therefore, is whether the voters 
reacted to the incentives of the new system by voting more for candidates than 
for parties, or did they continue to cast an ideological vote? 
 
 
Ideological vs. Personal Voting  
in the 2008 Parliamentary Election  
 
According to the theory of “uniform partisan swing”18, the regional 
support for a party or candidate in an election is typically an excellent predictor 
of its level of support in the following election. For example, let us assume that, 
in election t, lesser developed regions will support a left-wing party or candidate 
more than more developed regions do; in the absence of a major change (be that 
institutional, political, or otherwise), we will see the same pattern of support in 
the next election, t+1. 
In Figure 1 we see an illustration of this concept. The figure shows the 
percentage of the vote cast for the candidate of the left, Ion Iliescu, in the 1996 
and 2000 presidential elections, in the 41 Romanian counties. The correlation is 
very high, r = .98, so Iliescu’s 1996 share of the vote was indeed a very good 
predictor of his 2000 vote. The question is, then, if a Romanian party’s results at 
the regional or local level in consecutive parliamentary elections prior to the 
electoral reform are highly correlated, will they continue to be so after the 
                                                 
16
 Obviously, this analysis applies to the context of the 2008 parliamentary election; the 
2012 election was quite different in some important respects (most notably, the large 
number of seats won directly with an absolute majority by the USL [PSD-PNL] alliance). 
17
 Other works analyzing the impact of the new electoral system on Romanian parliamentary 
elections:Cosmin G. Marian; Ronald F. King, “Plus ça change: Electoral Law Reform and 
the 2008 Romanian Parliamentary Elections”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 43, 
no. 1, pp. 7-18; Sergiu Gherghina, George Jiglău, “Where Does the Mechanism Collapse? 
Understanding the 2008 Romanian Electoral System”, Representation, vol. 48, no. 4, 2012, 
pp. 445-459; Ronald F. King, Cosmin G.Marian, “Antagonism and Austerity: The December 
2012 Romanian Parliamentary Elections”, Electoral Studies,vol. 34, 2014, pp. 310-315. 
18
 Gary King, Ori Rosen, Martin Tanner, Alexander Wagner, Ordinary Economic Voting 
Behavior in the Extraordinary Election of Adolf Hitler, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University, Department of Government Working Paper, 2004. 
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enactment of the reform? Romania had three parliamentary elections in the 
2000’s: in 2000, 2004 and 2008. The first two were conducted under party list 
PR; the last one, under the new, single ballot mixed system. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Uniform partisan swing in Romanian presidential elections: 
County-level vote for Ion Iliescu, first round of the 1996 and 2000 elections 
 
Let us assume that, in 2008, the electoral reform did achieve one of its 
stated objectives, “personalizing” the vote, and so a substantial number of 
voters chose the candidate that they considered the best, irrespective of partisan 
affiliation. If that were the case, then the 2000 vote at the locality level for a 
given party will be a very good predictor of the 2004 vote for the same party, 
since the vote was ideological in both instances. At the same time, the 2004 will 
be a poorer predictor of the 2008 vote, since in the latter case, the qualities of 
each individual candidate will play an important role, driving up or down the 
vote for the party they represent (Figure 2). In other words, if the electoral 
reform had any impact, we expect it to be manifest in a lower correlation 
between a party’s results in 2004 and 2008 elections. 
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Figure 2. Electoral reform and its expected effect:  
A shift from ideological voting to personalized voting? 
 
Along with this longitudinal analysis, comparing the correlations between 
the locality-level results in consecutive elections, we perform an additional test. 
In 2000 and 2004, both Chambers of Parliament, the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies were elected using party list PR. In 2008, both Chambers were elected 
using a single ballot mixed system, with the Senate SMDs about twice the size 
of the Chamber’s SMDs. In 2000 and 2004, the ideological vote would lead us 
to expect a high correlation between the locality-level Senate and Chamber vote 
for a given party. In 2008, a non-ideological vote should result in a lower 
correlation, since it is highly unlikely that different candidates of the same party 
for the Senate and the Chamber will lessen or improve that party’s vote at the 
locality level by exactly the same amount. If this condition is not fulfilled, even 
an unequal increase or decrease in the locality-level vote will result in a lower 
correlation. Summing up, if the electoral reform brought with it a shift from 
ideological voting to “personalized” voting, the following two hypotheses must 
be confirmed: 
 
H1: Voting was strongly ideological in 2000 and 2004 and less ideological in 2008, 
resulting in a high correlation between the 2000 and 2004 locality level vote for a given party, 
but a lower correlation between the 2004 and 2008 locality level vote for the same party. 
H2: Voting was strongly ideological in 2000 and 2004 and less ideological in 2008, 
resulting in a high correlation between the locality level Senate and Chamber votes for a 
given party in both 2000 and 2004, but a lower correlation between the locality level 
Senate and Chamber votes for the same party in 2008. 
 
We test these hypotheses using locality-level data from the 2000, 2004, 
and 2008 parliamentary elections, for both Senate and Chamber. The data set 
includes about 3.000 cases (large cities, towns, and rural districts or villages). 
We start with an analysis of the vote for the leftist Social Democratic Party 
(PSD), the only large party which was continuously present as such on 
Romania’s political scene during the last decade (Figure 3 and Figure 4): 
2000 2004 2008
Party list PR Party list PR Single ballot mixed
Ideological vote Ideological vote Personalized vote (?)
Result "r-1" Result "r" Result "r+1"
High correlation between "r-1" & "r" Low correlation between "r" & "r+1"
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Figure 3. Locality-level PSD vote in 2004 against locality-level PSD vote in 2000 (Senate) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Locality-level PSD vote in 2008 against locality-level PSD vote in 2004 (Senate) 
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If we compare Figure 3 and Figure 4, the first hypothesis is confirmed. 
The 2000 Senate vote for the PSD is a very good predictor for PSD’s Senate 
vote in 2004 (.84 correlation), a result that is consistent with an ideological base 
of the vote. The 2004 Senate vote is a much poorer predictor of the 2008 Senate 
vote (.57 correlation), which is consistent with a shift from ideological voting to 
a “personalized” voting – when voting becomes largely a function of the 
personal qualities of the candidates, it becomes less predictable. 
However, if we compare Figure 5 and Figure 6, the second hypothesis is 
not confirmed. In Figure 5, we do observe a high correlation between Senate 
and Chamber vote in the 2004 elections, a result which is consistent with an 
ideological explanation of the vote (voting for the same party in both Senate and 
Chamber election). However, we see an equally high correlation in Figure 6; 
such a result does not indicate a vote that is less ideological in 2008 than it was 
in 2004. If the 2008 vote were less ideological, the personal qualities of 
candidates would increase or decrease the Senate and Chamber vote for the 
candidates of the same party, and the result will be a lower correlation than in 
2004. 
Thus, one result is consistent with the notion that the electoral reform did 
have an impact, namely, the lower correlation between the 2004 and 2008 vote, 
compared to the correlation between the 2000 and 2004 vote. But another result 
is inconsistent with such an impact – the fact that the correlation between the 
Chamber and the Senate vote is, in 2008, as high as it was four years before, 
and this latter result is more consistent with an ideological rather than 
“personalized” vote. It is theoretically possible to have a contagion effect, so 
that the vast majority of PSD’s “natural” electorate who deserted it in 2008, as 
well as the vast majority of PSD’s “unnatural” electorate who voted for the PSD 
in 2008, voted for the same party for both Chambers because they liked or 
disliked very much a certain candidate, and their vote for the other Chamber 
was merely a reflection of their first choice. However, we see this scenario as 
highly implausible. 
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Figure 5. Locality-level PSD Senate vote against locality-level PSD Chamber vote (2004) 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Locality-level PSD Senate vote against locality-level PSD Chamber vote (2008) 
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We think that a more plausible explanation, one that is consistent with all 
the results presented so far, is that the Romanian party system was, around 
2008, in a process of dealignment. If that is the case, then we continue to see 
ideological voting to the same extent as before, as indicated by the comparison 
of the correlations between the Senate and the Chamber votes in 2004 and 2008. 
Voting continues to be partisan, so how a certain locality voted for the Chamber 
in a given election is still an almost perfect predictor of how it voted for the 
Senate in the same election (Figure 5 and Figure 6). On the other hand, the 
process of dealignment means that the differences between more developed 
localities, which traditionally vote for rightist parties rather than PSD (bottom 
left in Figure 3), and lesser developed localities, which traditionally vote with 
the PSD (upper right in Figure 3), are decreasing (Figure 4). Therefore, a 
locality’s vote in the previous election is not such a good predictor of its vote in 
the subsequent election than it used to be (Figure 3 versus Figure 4). 
Even though the scenario of realignment is more plausible and consistent 
with this analysis than an institutional explanation, the realignment argument 
would benefit from, and become more persuasive, if additional data would back 
it. We expect that a longitudinal comparison of the profile of Romania’s main 
parties’ core constituencies, using individual-level data, will reveal that these 
constituencies were, by 2008, far less distinctive from one another than they 
were in the past (in the 1990’s, or even early 2000’s). More specifically, if the 
data indicates that, throughout the 1990’s and the early 2000’s, the Social 
Democrats were clearly a party of the have-nots, this may continue to be the 
case by 2008, but to lesser extent than in the past, with variables such as 
education or income becoming poorer predictors of the choice between the left 
and right than in the past. 
 
 
Other Parties, Additional Tests: Locality-Level Results in 
Parliamentary Elections, 2000-2008 
 
Throughout the decade analyzed here (roughly, late 1990’s to late 
2000’s), Romanian political life was dominated by five parties. The Social 
Democrats (PSD) were on the left and the liberals, PNL (the National Liberal 
Party), and the conservative PD-L (Democratic-Liberal Party, previously known 
as the PD, or Democratic Party) were on the right. The extreme left PRM 
(Greater Romania Party) promoted a mix of xenophobia, authoritarianism and 
nostalgia for Communism, and the UDMR has been an ethnic party 
representing the Hungarian minority. The PRM failed to clear the five percent 
threshold in 2008, thus reducing the number of parties represented in the 2008-
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2012 Parliament to just four (the handful of Conservatives elected under the 
joint PSD-PC label represented an insignificant number). 
To show that the results presented above are not an accident, we perform 
a more systematic test for all these parties, using the locality-level results for 
both the Senate and the Chamber from the last three parliamentary elections. In 
2004, the PNL and the PD (PD-L) ran as an Alliance (the “DA”, or “Truth and 
Justice” Alliance). Therefore, the only possibility to replicate the analysis for 
the moderate right vote was to analyze the total vote for these two parties, not 
just in 2004, but in 200019 and 2008 as well. Even though the PSD offers the 
clearest illustration, the results in Figure 7 indicate that, with some caveats, the 
results for the other parties are consistent with our analysis and the dealignment 
hypothesis. 
In the case of the moderate right parties, the correlation between the 
Chamber and the Senate vote in 2008 is as high as it was in previous elections 
(it is, in fact, higher than it was in 2000). This result is consistent with the 
dealignment scenario, but the decrease from the correlations between the 2000 
and 2004 locality-level votes, for both the Senate and the Chamber, to the 
correlations between the 2004 and 2008 votes is negligible, unlike the sharp 
decline that we saw for the PSD. However, we should keep in mind the fact 
that, in 2000, there are four moderate parties on the right, each gaining a 
respectable share of the total vote. In 2004, there are only two parties on the 
right (PNL and PD), but they formed an alliance and presented a joint list. 
Finally, in 2008, the PNL and the PLD (PD) presented separate lists of 
candidates. Overall, is it reasonable to expect that this instability of the offer on 
the right has affected the demand side (i.e., the voters), thus making the patterns 
of regional support for the right less predictable (and consequently lowering the 
correlations between the vote for right in consecutive elections before the 
dealignment). 
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 For 2000, when the Democratic Convention 2008 (CDR 2008) and the Alliance for 
Romania (ApR) received rather significant shares of the total vote (in the case of the 
Senate, 5.3 and 4.3 percent, respectively), we included the vote for these two parties in the 
total. Subsequently, the Democratic Convention disintegrated, and the ApR merged with 
the liberals (PNL).In 2004 and 2008, only the PD/PD-L and the PNL received a 
substantial share of the total vote. 
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Figure 7. Bivariate correlations, major parties’ vote in Romanian parliamentary elections,  
2000-2008 (Senate and Chamber votes, locality-level data) 
 
For the PRM, the results are also consistent with the dealignment 
hypothesis (although they can be consistent with an institutional effect as well, 
considering the lower correlation between the Chamber and the Senate vote in 
2008). Nonetheless, taking into account the dramatic decrease of PRM’s share 
of the vote in 2008, this lower correlation can be attributed to these low 
percentages across the localities and the very narrow range associated with 
them. Finally, the UDMR has an ethnic base, which is not affected by either the 
process of institutional reform, or by the dealignment process, which is 
restricted to “Romanian” parties, leaving the UDMR untouched. 
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Conclusion 
 
The change of Romania’s electoral system for parliamentary elections 
was promoted in order to give voters the possibility to choose candidates, rather 
than party lists. The underlying assumption was that, for many voters, their 
preferred candidate may not represent their preferred party. When that happens, 
personal qualities may trump ideology, and we see a shift from ideological 
voting to ‘personalized’ voting. In this paper we used aggregate (locality-level) 
data from the three parliamentary elections conducted in the 2000’s (2000, 
2004, and 2008, pre- and post-reform), to see whether this shift did in fact occur. 
A first test appeared to support this hypothesis. The 2000 vote for the 
leftist PSD was a very good predictor of its 2004 vote. However, its 2004 vote 
was a much poorer predictor of its 2008 vote. If we had ideological voting in 
2000 and 2004, but a mix of ideological and “personalized” voting in 2008, this 
could have resulted in a less predictable vote in the last parliamentary election, 
and thus a lower correlation between the 2004 and 2008 votes. Nonetheless, a 
further test appears to reject the hypothesis of “personalized” voting. In 2008, 
the correlation between the PSD’s votes in the Senate and the Chamber 
elections was as high as it was in previous elections, an indication of ideological 
consistency (and an ideologically-driven vote for both Chambers). We argue 
that the most plausible explanation for these results was a process of 
dealignment which started after the 2004 election. 
Our analysis of the results of the PSD offer the most clear illustration of 
an apparent effect of the electoral reform, an interpretation refuted by a further 
test. While these results are the clearest suggestion of a dealignment, we argue 
that the analysis of the results of the vote for the other major parties is also 
consistent with the dealignment hypothesis. What makes these latter results less 
clear-cut are the idiosyncrasies of the Romanian party system, with a 
fragmented, unstable and conflict-prone right, and an “extreme left” (PRM) that 
is becoming increasingly insignificant. It is possible to further test this 
hypothesis by using individual-level survey data. Such data will reveal whether 
background factors such as education, income, or urbanization, which 
throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s used to be very good predictors of the 
vote, have become in the late 2000’s much poorer predictors – a clear indication 
that the Romanian party system was indeed, by 2008, in a process of 
dealignment.
